



24 June 1971 
ENGLISH 
ORIGINAL: SPANISH 
I I I I I t l l l l l | I I I I I M I t t M > l l l l l l l < | l l | | > t i i t M I I I I I ( t n i t 1 I I M l i l l ' l l 1 I I H I i i n t l M t l l l l t l 1 I I I M I I M l t i l M l i t l II HI I I I M I t M l l l t l l l I M I H I I I I I I I I i 1 1 l l t l l ( U ! t l l I l l l l l t | t l l M I I I I I U I I I t l l l l l l I l l t l l t l ! I I I M I M | t i n H I ! l l l l l t M I M I ) t l l l ( l t l l l l l l l l 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA 
MEETING OP EXPERTS ON FORMULATION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIES FOR 
EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES 
Santiago, Chile, 26 July to 4 August 1971 
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF EXPORTS OF 
LATIN AMERICAN MANUFACTURES 
by 
Newton C. Ramalho * 
Working document 
* Seniof Regional Adviser on Public Administration, attached to the 
Public Administration Unit of ECLA. The opinions expressed in this 
document are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those 





TABLE OP CONTENTS 
Page 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EXPCRTS OF MANUFACTURES * 4 
III. INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 6 
1. Adjustments in relations with the United States 6 
2. Adjustments in relations with the European 
Economic Community 13 
3. CECLAt changes in objectives and institutional 
adjustments . 15 
IV. INSTITUTIONS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL 21 
1. Preliminary considerations 21 
2. Institutional support for the identification of export 
opportunities for Latin American manufactures 22 
3. Administrative structure relating to the formulation 
of foreign trade policy 25 
4. Administrative structure for the implementation of 
industrial export policy 28 





I. INTRODUCTION Page 1 
The most immediate and effective cause of the phenomenal expansion 
of international trade and in particular of expsrts of manufactures in the 
last two decades has been the vigorous creation of institutions at the 
world level, in certain regions and in several of the developed countries» 
Furthermore, these new institutions - political, legal, administrative, 
financial or technical - have been generated and made possible by the 
military, economic and social events that in our century have given and 
still are giving rise to supremely important changes in international 
relations of preponderance, interdependence and dependence, ^ 
These statements reflect facts so well-known as to deserve the name' 
of commonplaces«, It seems opportune to recall them, however, on the present 
occasion. As Latin America is gradually being pushed to one side in the 
process of world tirade expansion, it would appear worth whilo to inquire into 
what institutional', adjustments or reforms are required to counteract and if 
possible reverse this negative trend, and why our countries have lacked 
the ability or the power to put them into effect. 
It is also important to pemember that the relative reduction of Latin 
America's experts which has been taking place since 1948 is a twofold 
process: the region's percentage contribution to world market supplies of 
primary commodities is decreasing, and, with a very few exceptions, its 
1( In relation to the most immediate historical causes of the formation 
and development of the European Common Market (ECM), see Jacques Veraant, 
- "Los Estados Unidos y la integración europea (The United Staes and 
European integration), . in Integración política y económica (Political 
and economic integration}, a collection of essays edited by 0,.Sunkel 
(Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, Chile, ,1970)» See also, in the 
san® collection, Altiero Spinelli, "Función y perspectivas de las 
instituciones supranacionales europeas" (Function and prospects of 
European supranational institutions). . For similar data oñ the 
, Central American Common Market, see E, Torres-Rivas, Procesos y 
estructuras de una sociedad dependiente (Processes and structures of 
a dependent society) (Editorial Prensa Latinoamericana, Santiago, Chile, 
1969), in particular chapter V, "La nueva opción: el proyecto de 
integración económica centroamericana" (A new option: the Central 
American economic integration project). 
/incipient export 
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incipient export trade in industrial goods covers only those fields which the 
comntries with high income levels seem prepared to delegate to the developing 
countries. Generally speaking, the only manufactures that Latin America, like 
other lower—income regions, exports to the developed world are those 
characterized by widely-known and labour-intensive production techniques and 
little valme added. 
Admittedly, the structure of intra-regional exports of industrial g««ds 
is beginning to undergc modification, with the inclusion of certain predicts 
in whose case the requisite technology is more advanced and the value added 
greater. But where this happens preduction is almost invariably in the hands 
of foreign companies, while at the same time external capital conbina.es t® 
maintain or increase its participation in some ®f the traditional sectors, 
primarily those in which the value of output per worker is high - for 
instance, mining and the petroleum industry - or which are concerned with 
the manufacture or marketing ®f staple goods, 
2/ "According to data produced by ECLA, gross output per worker in Latin 
America (excluding Cuba) averaged 1,092 dollars, But this average 
conceals sectoral differences ranging from 353 dollars in artisan-type 
production,and 511 dollars in agriculture, to 3*001 dollars in modern 
industry, and as much as 5*443 in extractive industries, Tho latter 
figure goes down to 2,610 dollars if Venezuela is excluded" (ignacy Sachs, 
"Selection of techniques: problems and policies for Latin America", in 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol.XV, No.l, first half of 1970, 
p.20), As is pointed out by F, Fajnzylber, between I960 and 1968 the 
percentage growth rates of industrial investment by United States 
enterprises in Europe arid in Latin America were as follows: 
Manufactures Petroleum Mining Other Total 
sectors 
Latin America 12.8 2,0 4.5 4.8 5.6 
Europe . 13.9 12.9 2,7 17.5 14.2 
It should be noted, however, that investment in petroleum in Europe is 
placed chiefly in the field *f refining, distribution ard transpert, i.e., 
is of a more definitely industrial character, whereas in Latin America it 
is channelled mainly into extraction (see Fajnzylber's comments and tables 
in the ECLA study entitled Estrategia industrial y empresas internacionales 
(industrial strategy and international enterprises)(mime»graphed edition 
Rio de Janeiro, 1970, ppJ.7-20). 
With respect to the participation of foreign enterprises in industries 
producing consumer goods, such as food, beverages, tobacco, pharmaceutical 
products ard toilet articles, see the same author's tables and comments in 
Volume One of the study cited, relating to the experience of Brazil (in 
particular. pp,lll-ll9). /It seems 
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I t seems t o be g e n e r a l l y agreed t h a t the s i t u a t i o n ou t l i ned i n the 
f o rego i ng paragraphs i s unde s i r ab l e f o r L a t i n America, p a r t i c u l a r l y from the 
s tandpoint o f s t r a t e g y . The aim o f the present document i s t o i d e n t i f y some 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l measures which might he l p t o . r e o r i e n t a t e the L a t i n American 
c o u n t r i e s ' exper t s o f i n d u s t r i a l goeds on l i n e s b e t t e r c a l c u l a t e d t o se rve t h e i r 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
Such an ob jec t i ve may appear o ve r - amb i t i ou s . I t i s hoped, however, t h a t 
some p reg re s s i n t h i s ^ d i r e c t i o n w i l l . b e ach ieved , thanks t o the va luab le 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s made by exper t s and i n t e r n a t i o n a l and n a t i o n a l a genc i e s , 
e s p e c i a l l y i n more receri. y e a r s , t o the s tudy of t h i s sub jec t and k ind red 
problems. 
Before d e a l i n g w i th t he t o p i c i n hand, i t appears e s s e n t i a l t o rev iew, 
.however b r i e f l y , the p ro spec t s and d i f f i c u l t i e s f a c i n g L a t i n Amer i c a ' s export 
of manufactures t o two important markets which d i s p l a y s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : o / 
the Uni ted S t a t e s and the European Economic Community (EEC)., ^ 
Reference might e q u a l l y w e l l be made t o the markets o f Japan, o f the 
s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , and o f t h i r d c o u n t r i e s i n p roce s s o f development. 
The om i s s i on o f the f i r s t of t he se can be j u s t i f i e d on the grounds t ha t 
other documents t o be presented a t the Meet ing w i l l be devoted t o the 
d i s c u s s i o n of J a p a n ' s f o r e i g n t r a d e , w i t h s p e c i a l re ference t o the a spect s 
of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t f o r L a t i n America, Owing t o the sho r tage of 
r e l e van t data , i t has been impo s s i b l e t o ana l y se the problems o f t h e 
r e g i o n ' s t r ade r e l a t i o n s w i t h the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s ; i n t h i s connex ion, 
i t may perhaps be o f s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t t o the Meet ing to note the 
i n f o rma t i on t h a t the Japanese t r a d i n g companies are s t u d y i n g the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f o f f s e t t i n g , by means o f th ree -way o p e r a t i o n s , t h e 
customary f avou rab le t r ade ba lances o f the L a t i n American coun t r i e s ' "w i t h 
re spect t o the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t the d e f i c i t : shown in: i t s t r a d e 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t he s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s by Japan (see A.Hoson®, "Expor t 
promotion i n Japan and i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o L a t i n Amer ica " , chapter V , B, 
i n Economic B u l l e t i n f o r L a t i n America, Vo l , XV , N o , l , f i r s t h a l f o f 1970, 
P.97TT No th ing has been s a i d o f Latin American t r a d e w i th t h i r d 
c oun t r i e s i n the deve lop ing g roup, because t h e out look i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n 
i s not con s ide red t o be v e r y p rom i s i ng f o r the near f u t u r e , i n view r f 
such wel l -known d i f f i c u l t i e s as d e f i c i e n c i e s i n t r a n s p o r t and 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s , v e r t i c a l p re fe rences accorded by former 
metropo les , e t c . 
/ T h i s p r e l i m i n a r y 
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This preliminary survey of prospects and difficulties is felt to be 
indispensable, in the first place, because of the instrumental character of the 
institutions concerned, which means that they cannot be discussed in vacua 
or created as a mere demonstration effect. On the contrary, they will have 
to be designed with an eye to clear]y~defined strategies and objectives, 
established on the basis of adequate diagnoses; and they will have to take 
into account not only the resources available but also the conditions 
imposed by the environment, which, in the case under discussion, takes the f«rm 
of a set of highly complex systems, sane more open than others and some more 
closed. Secondly, the approach indicated is recommendable on account of the 
obvious strategical and tactical necessity of establishing priorities for the 
allocation »f human, physical and financial resources in short supply. It 
seems natural that the pertinent decisions should be determined by the 
objectives that can be recognized as the most promising, both in themselves 
and because of their greater political viability, 
II. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES 
As on similar occasions, for its fourteenth session EC LA prepared a 
number of documents directed towards the formulation of a Latin American 
development strategy. And, again as in the past, these documents endeavour 
to diagnose the reagion's underdevelopment in greater depth, and suggest 
policy measures to remedy the situation, but do not attempt to propose 
specific institutional devices for putting such measures into effect. It 
wfculd clearly be inappropriate for them to do s», among other reasons because 
it would constitute an encroachment upon the sphere of competence of the 
countries themselves or of other regional agencies such as, in the field of 
foreign trade, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the 
Central American Common Market or the Andean Group, 
Hence it seems justifiable for the present document to examine, in 
essence, the adequacy of the regional and national institutions in Latin 
America that relate to foreign trade - and in particular to the promotion of 
exports of manufactures - with due regard to the responsibilities laid upon 
this sector of the econony by ECLA's most recent conclusions respecting 
regional development strategy, 
/In ECLA's 
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In EGLA's view, it is both necessary and possible for Latin America to 
surpass the minimum annual rate of 6 per cent postulated by the United Nations 
as a growth target for the product of the low-income countries during the 
Second Development Decade, ECLA considers that the regional product could 
increase at annual rates cf 6,7 per cert up to 1975 and 7,3 per cent from 
then until 1980, i.e., by 7 per cent yearly as an average for the decade. 
For this target to be attained, the histerical rate of increase of the 
investment coefficient - 18,6 per cent - would have to be raised by 1975 to a 
rate of nearly 25 per cent, which would have to be kept up until the end ©f 
the decade. This would imply a potential savings deficit ©f 10, 000 million 
dollars by 1975 and 15,000 million by 1980, which could not be covered with 
external resources, since the net value of these has ranged from 1.5 to 1.7 
per cent of the product. 
The repercussions on the balance of payments would be equally striking. 
If imports expanded faster than exports, by 1980 the potential tr^de gap and 
balance-of-payinents deficit would be 4,600 million dollars arid. 11, 000 million, 
respectively. 'The difference between these two figures represents the 
magnitude of the potential, bur den of external financing, in payments of 
interest .and profits alone,n 
In the document from which these data are taken ̂ it is pointed out 
that the deficits in question could be covered or adjusted by means of external 
financing, exports and import substitution. 
With regard to external financing, the hope is expressed that the 
developed countries will meet the target proposed in the United Nations' 
International Strategy by provinding financial assistance equivalent to 
1 per cent of their product for the developing countries; and also that 
Latin America's share in this financing will continue to be 15 per cent, 
and that the rate of interest on loans will be reduced frcm 6 to 2 per cent. 
4/ Latin America and the Second Development Decade (E/CN.12/869, March 1971). 
/Import projections 
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Import projections are shown to imply that the substitution process will 
have to be intensified» This is held to be passible "within the\£cntext of 
regional industrial integration programmes", i.e., in the context of an increase 
in intraregional industrial exports. 
Export expansion projections are formulated on the basis of three 
hypothetical growth rates - relatively low, medium end high. The relatively 
law rate, although still representing an improvement upon historical trends, 
corresponds to the most satisfactory rate of development recorded during the 
1960s. It is of interest to note that the trade-balance and balance-of-payments 
deficits mentioned above would result from the application of the medium rate, 
despite the fact that it is higher than the best the 1960s can show. In the 
projections based on the highest rate these deficits would be reduced by 1980 
t® 1,900 and 7,800 million dollars. Another important point to note is that 
this last rate "was arbitrarily chosen as a means of demonstrating the effect 
of exports on the acceleration of the growth rate". 
An attempt will be made to identify, at the regional level in the first 
place, the institutional adjustments that might contribute to the expansion 
of exports of manufactures and consequently to the attainment of the other 
strategic targets. 
I K . INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
1. Adjustments in relations with the United States 
The action taken by Latin America to expand its exports to the United 
States has mainly consisted in requests for the reduction or elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers impeding the access of Latin American products 
to the United States market, or at least for the maintenance of the status quo 
in respect of such obstacles. These requests have been formulated in accordance 
•with the principles and norms that postulate general preferences and non-
recrorocity as the bases for relations between developed and developing 
countries. 
J>/ Ibidem, in particular pp. 36, 43 and 4-6, and table 11. 
/non-reciprocity 
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non-reciprocity as the bases for relations between developed and developing 
countries« Another major objective has been the multilateralization ef 
financial aid. —^ 
From the institutional standpoint, the creation of the Special 
Committee on Latin American C®-ordination (CECLA) and, more recently, of 
the Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation (CECON) within 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) would seem to 
constitute the most significant landmarks. 
In practice, the effects of the institutional norms - including the new 
Part IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - on relations 
between Latin America and the United States or other industrialized countries 
have been so slight as to induce ECLA to assert that in the Sacond 
Development Decade steps must be taken "to reduce the gap between the promises 
and commitments that have already been made, on the one hand, and actual 
achievements, on the other", <2/ 
Hence it would appear that the Latin American countries, while continuing 
to follow the traditional lines .of action and to use the corresponding 
instruments, should explore the possibility of adopting more direct and 
unilateral means tp. boost their exports of ..manufactures to the United . 
States and mitigate certain disadvantages attaching to direct United States 
investment in the region's industrial production» The suggestions that 
will be put forward in these connexions would be equally applicable to 
6/ These are matters of common knowledge. The course of the action taken 
can be traced through the Charter of Alta Gracia (1964), the Charter *f 
Tequendama (1967), the amendments t® article 37 of the Charter of the 
Organization of American States (OAS) determined by the Buenos Aires 
Protocol (1967), and the Latin American Consensus «f Vina del Mar (l?69)c 
With regard to the bases of the norms, principles and proposals set forth 
in these documents, and to their practical application, see, for example, 
"Latin America and the second session of UNCTAD" and "Trade policy and 
the Latin American Consensus of Vina del Mar", in Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, Vol,XIII, No.l, September 1968, and Vol,XV, No.2, first 
half of 1970, See also International economic co-operation and the third 
session of UNCTAD (E/CN.12/889» March 1971), section 5(a), "Relations 
with the United States". 
7/ International economic co-operation and the third session of UNCTAD, 
op. cit., p, 10, 
/relations with 
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relations with other industrialized countries«, There the effects produced 
would be less marked, because of the larger scale of the United States' 
industrial investment in Latin America« 
(a) Exports to the United States and third countries effected by-
United States enterprises established in Latin America 
In 1960-1968, direct investment by United States enterprises in other 
countries resulted in unfavourable balances in relation to Canada and all 
regions except Europe, Where Latin America was concerned, the deficit, 
taking into -account capital contributions and remittances of profits, 
amounted to 6,745 million dollars. The mining and petroleum sectors, in which 
output per worker and per unit of capital is usually very high, were mainly 
responsible for this result, A favourable balance »f 376 million dollars was 
shown by manufacturing companies under this head,-^ But the net effect en the 
balance of payments was entirely different; the balance was favourable in the 
case of mining and petroleum and unfavourable in that cf the manufacturing 
sector. The explanation lies in the destination of sales and in the imported 
inputs used by industrial production in Latin America, In 1957, 41 and 
13 per cent, respectively, of the total sales of the mining and petroleum 
sectors were made within the region, and the high residual percentages were 
absorbed by experts to the United States and third countries. In contrast, 
96 per cent of the output of the manufacturing enterprises was sold within 
Latin America, only 2 per cent being exported to the United States and another 
9/ 
2 per cent to third countries.~ The position is not the same in relation 
tc Canada, Europe and Asia, where the United States industrial enterprises 
exported, respectively, 22, 20 and 16 per cent of their output (in terms cf 
value) to the United States and to third countries in that year.^^ 
8/ Sea the special study "The expansicn of international enterprises and 
their influence on develcpment in Latin America" in Economic Survey 
of Latin America« 1970 (E/CN.12/868/Add.2, January 1971), tables 24 
and 27. 
9/ Ibidem.» table 32, 
10/ See again the same table. 
/If the 
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If the United States manufacturing enterprises established in Latin 
America were to export to the United States and third countries a percentage 
of their output equivalent to the proportions noted for Europe or Canada, 
the aforesaid negative effect on the balance of payments would of coiirre be 
perceptibly reduced, but perhaps not cancelled cut or converted into a 
favourable balance^ in view of the coefficient of important inputs in indus~ 
trial production as a whole and in exports ©f manufactures, which is 
probably higher in Latin America than in Europe ©r Canada. 
Technological progress in the region and the headway made by 
integration movements, which will enable the scope of the import substitution 
process to be extended, should bring down this coefficient. If in addition 
exports of manufactures to third countries could be expanded, the net impact 
on the balance of payments would undoubtedly be very significant. The strategic 
importance of an effort in this direction can be seen straight away, and would 
12/ justify it immediately, even if some risks were involved, — 
11/ For seme relevant indices relating to Brazil, see F.Fajnzylber, op,cit., 
pp.327 and 328. According to the report of the Foreign Trade Portfolio 
(Carteira de Comercio Exterior - CACEX) of the Banco do Brasil for 1969, 
the import content of the products exported amounted to 25 per cent in 
that year. Nevertheless, as some of the Latin American manufactures 
exported really involve very simple processing of primary products, the 
net effect on the balance of payments might be modified in favour of 
the region, if the exports in question were substantially increased, 
12/ Mexico's new economic strategy includes the development of exports of 
the manufactures produced by the foreign enterprises established 
in the country (among which United States companies predominate)• 
See "Comentarios sobre la estrategia economica de Mexico" (Comments 
on Msxico's economic strategy), in the periodical Comercio Exterior, 




One measure which might make for the attainment of such an objective 
would be a provision to the effect that the United States manufacturing 
enterprises (and of course other foreign enterprises) established in the 
region should export an increasing proportion of their total sales to 
1°/ 
their country of origin or to third countries.-^ In order to determine 
appropriate scales and time schedules, studies by industry and by country 
would have to be carried out; and to facilitate the implementation of the 
norms concerned, authorization should perhaps be given for two or more 
foreign enterprises to take the value of their sales and exports in the 
aggregate. In order to minimize possible opposition and reprisals (the 
United States enterprises above all would have special reasons for 
objecting to such m e a s u r e s t h e pertinent norms should be laid down 
simultaneously by all the countries of the region. Action in this direction 
couiu be eo-ordinatcd by GEGIA. 
(b) Institutionalization of support for Latin American enterprises 
supplying United States industrial or marketing enterprises 
Owing to industrial development, the desirability of distributing 
risk, and other causes, production absorbs inputs of basic and intermediate 
goods which are to an increasing extent produced by other enterprises. 
Some factors, of which perhaps the most Important is the cascade tax on sales 
13/ In Fajnzylber's study on Brazil (cp.cit., p. 271,6) a similar 
suggestion is made. 
14/ The net result of investment abroad became of fundamental importance 
for the United States economy from the moment when the downward 
trend of its trade-balance surplus reached critical levels in 
relation to its military expenditure abroad. Furthermore, "the 
articulation of regional economic spaces as a mechanism of collective 
defense against the action of the hegemonic centres" would seem 
to constitute one of the basic features of the restructuration of the 
international econony now under way. See C. Furtado, "La 
restructuración de la economía internacional y las relaciones entre 
Estados Unidos y América Latina" (The restructuration of the 
international economy and relations between the United States and 





between dealers and producers, may encourage Vertical integration within largo 
enterprises. But in Latin America this incentive is likely to disappear as 
the result of the widespread adoption of the tax on value added. The 
advantages of this form of taxation include that of making it easier to 
calculate the tax burden incorporated in the goods produced at any stage 
of the industrial csr marketing cycle. It would also facilitate the 
application of the integrationist principle of taxation solely in the: country 
of destination, which the Latin American Free-Trade Association (LAFTA) would 
support,^/ 
But in Latin America it is not only in the production of complex goods 
that national enterprises, including those of an agricultural and extractive 
character, make an important contribution to the activities of foreign 
"terminal" enterprises. This is because of the substantial part played by 
foreign enterprises, especially those of the United States, in the 
production of staple goods, such as processed foods, beverages, tobacco 
and some chemical and pharmaceutical products,^' In these fields production 
is geared primarily to the domestic market, but in some cases exports are 
17/ 
gaining significance and showing signs of expanding.— 
These circumstances are of special concern to Latin America, They often 
mean that the terminal enterprises are placed in a monopsomistic or 
oligopsomistic position which enables them to administer.to their own 
advantage the prices of the inputs with which they are provided by small- and 
medium-scale supplier enterprises, most of these being national.^/ 
15/ See Problemas fiscales de la integración económica latinoamericana 
(Fiscal problems of Latin American economic integration), a document 
prepared by Professor Werner Grau, of the Inter-American School of Public 
administration, for the Second Meeting of Directors of Inland Revenue 
Departments (LAFTA, May 1970), and issued in a mimeographed edition by 
the Funda9ao Getulio Vargas (Río de Janeiro), 
16/ See footnote 2/, 
17/ See the statistical data on Brazil furnished by the CACEX report to which 
reference is made in footnote 11/. 
18/ An eloquent case in point seenis to be afforded by Peru's exports ®f fish 
meal. Sales abroad "reached the unprecedented value of 293.7 million 
dollars, thanks te the drastic increase in export, prices resulting from 
the Government's new policy of taking international marketing into its 
own hands,..» See "Las exportaciones peruanas" (Peruvian exports) in 
Carta al Exportador (Letter to Exporters), publication the Banco 
Industrial del Peru, N®.9, May 1971. / T h e d e f e n c e 
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The defence of enterprises in the latter category against the 
administration cf their prices by terminal manufacturing or marketing 
enterprises has been an important feature of economic policy in the 
developed world« 
In this connexion, it is worth while to draw attention to article 85 
•f the Rcxne Treaty, which considers incompatible with the Common Market 
several practices that are well-known to be adopted, in Latin America by 
many industrial or marketing enterprises, with a view to the administration 
of their suppliers' prices. It is surprising that the Montevideo Treaty 
(I960) - even with the amendments to article 49 stipulated in resolution 65 -
contains no similar provision, despite the fact that it was concluded at a 
later date than the Rome Treaty (1957)» The same may be said of the norms 
for the Central American Common Market, since those relating to unfair trade 
practices are more in the nature of anti—dumping regulations, Article 75 
the Cartagena Agreement, on the other hand, might be considered to have the 
same scope as the aforesaid article of the Rome Treaty, 
In Japan the expedient initially adopted to defend the small- and 
mediumr-scale enterprises against the powerful terminal and marketing 
enterprises was the fixing of their prices by the Government, To follow up 
this line of action, support was given to the association of these smaller 
enterprises in veritable syndicates for the defence of their prices and 
other interests (price administration by the Government was always a difficult 
problem) vis-a-vis the bigger concerns. Financial and technical co-operation 
on the part of the Government - and also of the large enterprises - in the 
development «f the enterprises of small and medium size has constituted one 
of the most effective instruments of Japan's industrial and over-all employment 
and development policy,^^ 
In these instances, the pertinent legal and administrative institutions 
gave proof of their exceptional efficacy, although all the enterprises 
- terminal and supplier alike. - were Japanese or formed part of a "clssed" 
national or multinational economic system. In such circumstances, transfers 
19/ For fuller details, see the study on export promotion in Japan referred 
to in footnote 
/of income 
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of inccme between the small and mediucnsized enterprises on the one hand 
and the large ones on the other might ultimately have a depressive effect 
on the economyj but it would be to some extent mitigated by the fact that 
these transfers would be effected within the economic system concerned» 
In Latin America's case, on the other hand, they would largely take place 
between the national supplier units and the foreign "terminal" manufacturing 
or marketing enterprises, i,e,, between the underdeveloped economies of the 
region and the countries at the centre of the world econony« 
It would be justifiable on these grounds for the Latin American ccuntriet 
to devote special attention to the problem and to endeavour to establish at the 
earliest possible date the legal and administrative institutions required 
for its solution«, Perhaps the basic norms ought to be incorporated in 
integration treaties. At the level of the individual countries, the tax 
on value added mi$it constitute a valuable instrnmeri for controlling the 
price administration practices adopted by the large enterprises against 
the interests of those of small and medium size« The usual system of 
collecting this tax would facilitate the operation. Furthermore, official 
control could be exercised on the basis of sampling, and would also be 
facilitated by the fact that there are not usually many terminal enterprises 
in any one sector (if there were, that in itself would be a hindrance to 
undesirable market practices). It seems obvious, however, that even if 
official control were difficult and costly to institute, it would be well 
worth paying for, in view of the direct importance and the multiplier effect 
of the benefits it would bring in its train, 
2, Adjustments in-relations with the European Economic Community 
Clearly, all that has been said in the foregoing sector would hold 
good for Latin America's relations with other courtries at the centre. The 
extent to which this would be so migjrt be described as proportional to the 
scale of these countries1 investment in industrial or marketing activities 
in the region. It should be noted, however, that the States members cf the 
European Economic Community, and the Community itself, are in a peculiar 
position, much less favourable to the Latin American countries from the 
standpoint of the viability of the concessions, tariff reductions and other 
facilities which, the latter are requesting as general and non-reciprocal 
preferences. /The fact 
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The fact of the matter is that the Rome Treaty has instituted a customs 
union among the Six, and a system of trade with third countries which must 
necessarily be based on reciprocal concessions, specifically established 
in ad hoc treaties$ that in practice the Treaty in question rules out, even 
in relation to third countries in the developing group, any tariff or non-
tariff concessions which are not of this reciprocal and specific kind5 that 
nothing has come of all the criticisms which, on the basis of 5ATT articles I 
and XXIV, have been levelled at the discriminatory nature of the agreements 
concerted by the Community with third countriesj that.these agreements bear 
witness to the Community's political aim of developing an area of influence 
in relation with its membersr former colonies and overseas territories and 
certain Mediterranean countries; that this area is likely to be enlarged by the 
United Kingdom's expected accession to the Community. All these points are 
highlighted by a lucid legal interpretation arid abundant documentation, in 
a special study entitled "Relations between Latin America ana the European 
Economic Community" (E/CN.12/868/Add.2).<^/' tohat this study does not 
mention is the possible existence of an entente cordiale among the leading 
countries at the centre, in support of this and other areas of influence. 
But the mary escape clauses which have rendered the provisions of the 
new Part IV of GATT virtually inoperative arouse the suspicion that such 
an entente does exist de facto0~"^' 
20/ See ais© «CEE: sus relaciones con el tercer mundo» (EEC^a rslatioaa 
with the Third World) and "La posición oficial británica sobre el 
pedido de ingreso en la CEE" (The official British position 
respecting the application to join EEC),, in Boletín de Integración 
(integration Bulletin), No. 59, November 1970, ppa622 and'625, 
respectively. 
21/ "The Organization of American States is a classic example of a regional 
grouping which reduces the options of all its members but one and 
increases the power of a world centre, The association of a group 
of African countries with the European Common Market constitutes another 
of these asymmetrical groupings, whose negative features will stand 
out with increasing clarity in the polycentric scene," (C. Furtado, 
op. cit., p. 385.) 
/what institutional 
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What institutional implic at ions should the recognition of these 
circumstances carry with it for Latin America? 
It would seem that a counter-reaction on the same lines should conduce 
to the strengthening of Latin American unity, in such a way as to enable 
the region to adopt concerted unilateral decisions in defence of its 
interests vis-a-vis any hegemonic centres which may wish to set themselves up 
as the poles of areas of influence governed by "special relations". 
This should imply not a weakening but a strengthening of Latin America's 
relations with the Group of 77, Nor should it be any bar to the conclusion 
«f bilateral agreements between Latin American countries and any existing 
or future hegemonic centre (such as the agreements which Argentina and 
Uruguay are negotiating with EEC); on the contrary, the reinforcement of 
regional unity would buttress the position of the individual Latin American 
countries making it easier for them to secure more equitable terms in 
agreements of that kind and in any other instruments regulating their 
individual or collective relations with the centres in question. 
It would seem that CECLA, if strengthened on the lines suggested in 
the next section, might constitute the institutional basis for the closer 
cohesion of the Latin American countries, 
3o CECLA: changes in objectives and institutional adjustments 
The developing Latin American countries have formed four integration 
groupings — the Central American Conanon Market (CACM), the Carribean Free-
Trade Association (CARIFTA), the Latin American Free-Trade Association (LAFTA) 
and the Andean Group, Although this last subregional organization is by 
definition incorporated within the framework of LAFTA, its basic institutions 
and those which it is building up give it a distinctive character even in 
relation to LAFTA itself. 
In Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC) the European Free-
Trade Association (EFTA) and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(COMECON) form an apparently similar pattern. But in substantive terms no 
such parallelism exists. These organizations — besides being based on 
extensive physical integration and traditional trade flows - reflect political 
polarizations which have their well-known origins in the consequences of the 
/Second World 
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Second World War, The result has been the emergence of dualisms that are 
difficult to reconcile« The first of these exists between the one-time 
colonial powers which are members of EEC and EFTA and the corresponding 
overseas countries and territories. This dualism has somewhat undermined 
the stability of EFTA, and shows signs of weakening it to the benefit of 
EECj corroboration of this would seem to be afforded by the negotiations 
under way for the United Kingdom's accession to the Common Markets That 
event in its turn, by strengthening the European hegemonic grouping, would 
make it easier for EEC to lay down the. terms of its "special relations" with 
the overseas countries and territories referred to above. The consequences 
might be even more unfavourable to latin America than those to which CECLA 
has been drawing attention ever since the Alta Gracia meeting. 
The second dualism is between the market economies and the centrally-
planned economies of Europe, Hard as it is to get rid of on the political plan? 
this dualism is visibly and steadily fading out in the spheres of scientific 
and technological co-operation and expansion of reciprocal trade flewss 
This hitler degree of integration will have helped to raise Europe's level 
of economic activity and consequently to increase its trade with Latin 
America in absolute figures. But it has produced no other benefits, even 
as regards the terms of trades the international prices resulting from 
relations between the central and peripheral market economies are usually 
the same as those quoted in trade agreements and contracts between the 
socialist nations and third countries. 
While Europe has derived exceptional advantages both from its increased 
cohesion and from the discriminatory preferences and other forms of support 
that it has granted to the countries with which it maintains special 
relations, these circumstances have also redounded to the benefit of the 
United States, which has stepped up its investment in the European market 
and developed its trade with Africa, The African countries too have profited. 
Some of them are among the countries with the most rapid rates of economic 
growth,^/ 
22/ See Arthur Lewis, The development process (United Nations publication, 




What has been CECLA1s line of policy in face of this situation? 
What practical results has it achieved? Would some change in its strategic 
action be justified? If so, what institutional adjustments would be required? 
CECLA was originally established as a special committee of IA-ECCSCCj, 
to study the possibility of co-ordinating the Latin American countries' 
position at the first session cf the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD}<, Pursuant to these instructions, it approved the Charter 
of Alt a Gracia early in 1964, and then, in conformity with its texm of 
reference,ceased to exist as an OAS agency. 
In December 1964, however, the countries signatories to the Charter, 
at a meeting in Lima, decided to establish CECLA as a standing agency, 
implicitly independent of OAS,—^ and "in the nature of a Latin American 
forum to deal with questions specifically relating to UNCTAD and with any 
other matters having a bearing on international trade and economic development'^ 
It was expressly stated that the Committee would be governed by the norms and 
guiding principles of the Charter of Alta Gracia and that its mission would 
be to conciliate the interests of its members and promote joint action on 
their part,, These basic objectives have remained unchanged, but subsequent 
CECLA resolutions have couched them in more explicit terms,—^ 
It is a well-known fact that CECLA made an outstanding contribution to 
the work of concerting the unitary orientation of the 77 and formulating the 
principles of justice and equity in trade relations which were endorsed at 
23/ See the IA-ECOSOC publication UP/CIES - 7/CECLA/47, Rev02, including 
p. <56, 2, f. 
24/ See footnote 21/, 
25/ A resolution of the Third Meeting at the Expert Level, for instance, 
defined the Committee as a forum for discussicn of specific decisions 
of UNCTAD and other world economic agencies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and any other body of an economic character. See the information 
document on CECLA prepared by the ECLA Trade Policy Division (Documento 
Informativo, mimeographed edition, 1971), 
/the first 
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the first session of UNCTAD and are reflected in the new Part IV of GATT, as 
well as in the norms and targets established for the Second United Nations 
Developingr£ Dec ad e»-^^ 
Attention has already been drawn in the presant document (section III, 
subsection 1} to t-hsse initiatives and to the feebleness of their practical 
effects, CECLA itself recognized this at its Fourth Meeting at the Ministerial 
Level, in a resolution (12/63) which alleges that "the second session of 
UNCTAD failed to satisfy the aspirations of the Latin American countries and 
of the other developing countries of the world", on account of institutional 
shortcomings in UNCTAD itself^ elements of inflexibility in the platforms \ v 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (GECD) and of 
the Group of 77, and "want ©f sufficient political will on the part of the 
industrialized countries» market and centrally-planned economies alike". 
These conclusions led CECLA to urge the need for Latin America to reconsider 
in depth all its trade and development problems and, in particular, the line 
©f action it would follow in the future, together with its conceptual model 
of development strategy and the restructuration n£ international economic 
relations« "Latin America cannot tackle new problems with the same concepts 
and operational mechanisms that it has applied in the past," ^ 
These assertions by CECLA would lead one to suppose that vitally 
important changes would be introduced in its aims, legal base and structure. 
But nothing of the kind has taken place, Ncr, to judge from later documents 
such as the Latin American Consensus of Vina del Mar and the Declaration of 
Buenos Aires addressed to EEC, have strategic concepts undergone any perceptibl« 
modification. 
26/ See Latin America and the Second Development Decade» op, cit,, p.2: 
"Basically, the Strategy (for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade)...incorporates the well-known ideas that have been so much 
discussed in international forums, and, in general, the measures and 
recommendations adopted by UNCTAD and other international agencies, 
such as GATT." 
27/ Declaration of Santo Domingo (1968). See information document referred 




CECLA is not a supranational institution® Even as an inter-governmental 
agency it lacks the support of an international treaty. Hence its decisions 
are not legally binding on the member countries, which may well detract from 
their force« The recommendations formulated in resolution 14/68 M."^ would 
seem to indicate that this is what has happened in practice. 
At the tine of CECLA's second meeting it was decided that the Committee 
should have no administrative structure or technical assistance agencies of 
its own, but should make use of the media existing in the region. Consequently 
it has operated on the basis of studies prepared at its request or on their 
own acconnt by ECLA, the Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), 
LAFTA, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Central American Bank 
for Economic Integration (BCIE), the Permanent Secretariat of the General 
Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (SIECA)j the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), IA-ECOSOC, etc», and by the 
specialized agencies of the member countries. 
Owing to these institutional features, CECLA cannot submit requests 
directly to its advisory agencies» It has to do so through the member 
countries, rising the Co-ordination Secretariat which is in operation at the 
moment and the liaison agencies existing at the country l e v e l , , 
Although these co-ordination media have sufficed hitherto, it would be 
preferable for CECLA to be endowed with the powers and resources required to 
ensure that it can make full use of the region's technical expertise potential« 
This would be justified by the fact that its advisory agencies, apart from 
their geographical dispersion and institutional isolation, have their own 
autonomous programmes of activities^ which generally take up all the normal 
working time ©f their personnel, whose efforts it is difficult to pool in 
such circumstances» 
28/ Ibidem, p. 10, 
29/ "The Co-ordination Secretariat of CECLA, in the case of both regular 
and extraordinary meetings, shall be the responsibility of the country 
where the last meeting was held," (Decision adopted at the 
Extraordinary Meeting at the Ministerial Level, Vina del Mar, 1969.- See 
the information document referred to in the preceding footnotes, p, 112» 




CECLAts action has been essentially reflex, that is, related to 
international forums or special questions stemming from non-Latin American 
initiatives. At the Vina del Mar Meeting an auspicious change was decided 
upon: the taking of the initiative and the adoption of unilateral positions 
by the region^ no longer in international forums, but directly and in 
relation to a hegemonic power. This new modus operandi carried with it, as 
was natural and desirable, an invitation to dialogue and to consultations and 
negotiations. 
The receptive attitude of the President of the United States to the 
Consensus of Vifia del Mar would seem to bear out the wisdom of this new 
orientation of CECLA, Another step forward, however, might well be timely: 
it would be desirable for CECLA, without shelving its activities at the 
level of the world as a whole and of third countries, to devote attention 
to stepping up integration of the region and for the region, 
A serious institutional lacuna seems to be constituted by the non-
existence of an exclusively Latin American organization responsible for 
activating the integration of LAFTA, the Central American Conmon Market, 
CARJ.FTA and the Anean Group^ and for expanding these associations by the 
accession of those developing countries of the region which are still, to a 
greater or lesser degree, divorced from them. 
The exceptional potsntialities of increased integration at this general 
level - particularly with respect to facilitating new lines of industrial 
import substitution and strengthening the region's bargaining capacity -
would make it worth while for CECLA to expend special effort on the 
attainment of this objective^ To that end, its restructuration would 
probably be advisable. Perhaps it should be institutionalized by means of 
an international treaty, and provided with its own permanent supporting 
cadre of technical and administrative experts. 
As a more immediate move, CECLA should perhaps begin forthwith to examine 
the different strategy models and development institutions (especially those 
concerned with foreign trade, industrial programming and foreign investment) 
which have recently been adopted in the region*, Furthermore, it ought perhaps 
to study the possible effects of the institutions in question, with the aim of 
designing such measures as might prove necessary to prevent the diversity of 
the countries' objectives and policies from militating against the integration 
and teleological interests of the regicn. /IV INSTITUTIONS 
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XV. INSTITUTIONS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL 
1, Preliminary considerations 
In a recent document ECLA points out the impossibility of "envisaging 
a standard development strategy and policy" for the Latin American countries, 
or even for one of the traditional groups of countries - large, medium-sized 
and small. Nevertheless, the fact that they have structural problems and 
obstacles in common makes it possible "to define essential features of 
development strategy which are fairly broadly applicable". These features 
would include the establishment of "a more favourable framework or system 
for trade and co-operation within Latin America itself and vis-a-vis the 
rest of the world, especially the industrialized countries", which would 
mean that obvious importance would attach to external objectives connected 
with "the expansion and diversification of exports, regional integration 
30/ 
and external financial co-operation".— 
The impossibility of formulating common strategies and policies, even 
with respect to foreign trade, makes it impracticable ipso facto to design 
a corresponding general model of administrative organization and institutional 
norms which would be applicable in all the countries of the region. The 
point is that institutions are instrumental; they must be geared to 
strategic and short-term objectives. But since there are, as already 
stated, common problems and obstacles, which extend to the realm of foreign 
trade, more or less widely applicable solutions can be propounded. An 
attempt will be made to do so in the following sections. 
30/ See Basic aspects of Latin American development strategy (E/CN.12/ 
Rev.1, March 1971), pp. 35-36. 
/2. Institutional 
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2« Institutional support for the identification of export 
opportunities for latin American manufactures 
It is in connexion with the composition of export supply that the 
greatest institutional weakness is observable in the Latin American 
countries,, The explanation lies in the fact that the region's industrial 
development process has from the very outset been tailored to import 
substitution. Consequently, even in the countries which have d eveloped 
manufacturing production to the greatest extent, there are few enterprises 
which look on exports as a permanent activity. Generally speaking, they 
are regarded as a stand-by to which recourse need be had only in periods 
31/ 
when demand is flagging in the over-protected domestic market.— 
Moreover, even in the more limited sphere of import substitution, 
the Latin American countries have not reached the point of formulating 
industrial and trade policies based on technically-established strategical 
targets. It is common knowledge that development in this field, with the 
transition by successive stages from the production of consumer goods 
(including durables) to intermediate and capital goods, has been mainly • 
I J A / 
spontaneous, and has been achieved at a heavy social cost.— 
These shortcoming testify to the existence of institutional weaknesses, 
for which remedies have begun to be sought only in more recent years. 
At the country level, efforts in this direction may be considered to have 
started with the institution of over-all and sectoral planning. The next 
step was the establishment of export incentives and the creation or 
strengthening of agencies responsible for administering these measures. 
31/ For the findings of research on Brazil's experience in this respect, 
see F. Fajnzylber, Estudio de algunos aspectos básicos para la 
formulación de una estrategia de exportaciones de manufacturas (Study 
of basic material for the formulation of an Industrial export strategy), 
ECLA/Instituto de Pesquisas Económicas Aplicadas (IFEA), mimeographed 
edition, 1969. 
32/ See M.C. Tavares, "Growth and decline of import substitution in 
Brazil" (a study drafted on the basis of research carried out by 
the ECLA/BNDE group in Rio de Janeiro), in Economic Bulleting for 
Latin America, Vol. IX, N° 1, March 1964, pp. 1-60; and Santiago 
Macario, "Protectionism and industrialization in Latin America", 
ibidem., pp. 61-102. 
/Here encouraging 
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Here encouraging results have been achieved, especially with respect to 
intra-regional exports, showing that the measures in question and the 
regional integration treaties and agencies can be credited with an 
appreciable degree of efficacy. 
In this connexion, the point to be stressed is that integration 
treaties, by promoting closer contact between the countries concerned 
and increasing their knowledge of one another, have enabled export 
opportunities to be identified. A contribution to this positive effect" 
has been made even by the negative mechanism of non-automatic tariff 
reduction established in the Montevideo Treaty, since it means that official 
research on the potentialities of domestic production vis-a-vis that of 
regional competitors becomes an indispensable requisite. Moreover, the 
intra-regional exports fostered by these treaties are largely effected 
by the powerful international enterprises, which have enough resources at 
their disposal to carry out market studies and other essential research.^/ 
It is in relation to third countries that the Latin American 
entrepreneur finds himslef at a singular disadvantage -with regard to exports 
of manufactures. He knows almost nothing of their markets and generally 
lacks the financial and technical capacity required for undertaking the 
necessary research. In their turn, the subsidiaries of international 
enterprises established in the region have not normally been set up with 
a view to exporting to third markets, and in many cases are not authorized 
to do so in competition with their parent firms or with other subsidiaries. 
The strategic significance of import substitution at the regional 
level, which industrial integration would tend to promote, would not 
detract from the importance of exports of Latin American manufactures to 
33/ See F. Fajnzylber, Sistema industrial y exportación de manufacturas 
(Industrial system and exports of manufactures) and Estrategia 
industrial y empresas internationales. Posición relativa de America 
Latina y Brasil (Industrial strategy and international enterprises. 
Relative position of Latin America and Brazil) (both issued by 
ECLA, Rio de Janeiro, November 1.970), especially pp. 211 et seq, 
. and pp. 167 et seq, respectively. It is also symptomatic that the 
great majority of industrial complementarity agreements in the LAFTA 
area are being negotiated by private enterprise, generally foreign 
firms; see in this connexion Recent events in the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (E/CN.12/8875 March 1971). 
/third countries, 
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third countries, especially those vdth high income levels.*^ This 
has been recognized over and over again, in statements ranging from 
those formulated at Alta Gracia to those contained in Resolution 2626 of 
the General Assembly of tho Uhited Nations, which relates to the 
Second Development Decade» 
A basic requisite for designing an industrial export strategy 
is a meticulous analysis of potential danand for goods which the 
would-be exporter can produce relatively advantageously» It is knowledge 
of these demand prospects that will have to determine the investment 
concerned and consequently the measures to be adopted for tapping internal 
and external savings, purchasing technologies, preparing and evaluating 
projects, training personnel, formulating an appropiate labour policy, 
creating and adjusting infrastructures, etc.^2/ 
It would no doubt be too much for the financial and technical 
capacity of most of the Latin American countries to establish and 
maintain an agency capable of supplying at an operative cost the essential 
data required for designing and readjusting an industrial development 
process strategically orientated towards exports of manufactures to third 
countries. Such an agency should have offices in the principal countries 
where income levels are high or which for other reasons (the size of 
their population, for instance) might constitute significant potential 
markets. It would act as an observer of the import trends concerned, 
the degree of international competition in the field under consideration, 
etc., all in relation to the potential relative advantages of the 
country or countries it represented. It would also need to be qualified 
to offer guidance with respect to firm3 of consultants for project 
engineering studies and other lines of research; to suggest suppliers of 
equipment and plant; to give advice on sources of financing, on legal 
requirements and on other conditions that would have to be met in order 
to export to the various markets; and so forth. In addition, it would 
have to be authorized to conduct negotiations abroad in respect of all 
these matters. 
24/ See the present document, section II. 




Given existing conditions in Latin America, it -would seem that an 
agency of this calibre would have to be set up as a multinational public 
or mixed enterprise, with adequate capital, which would sell its services 
to public or private Latin American entrepreneurs and perhaps to foreign 
entrepreneurs who were thinking of placing investment in the region. 
Similarly, it would advise financial institutions on the profitability 
prospects of projects for which loans for pre-investment studies were needed. 
Lastly, it would have to maintain a permanent information service on 
business opportunities, trends shown by the Latin American countries' main 
import and.export products in the various markets, etc.^^ 
3. Administrative structures relating to the formulation 
of foreign trade policy 
The definition of foreign trade policy has been so difficult a problem 
in the region that examination of the de facto position in almost all the 
Latin American countries would show that such a policy, in the sense of 
co-ordination of component policies with an eye to strategic objectives, 
has never existed. The situation is even less favourable as regards, more 
specifically, exports of manufactures. 
In this last field, the difficulties have been partly due to the 
causes mentioned in the preceding section. But from a broader standpoint, 
some part has been played by other factors, such as the various countries, 
levels of over-all and industrial development, and their dependence on 
a small number of export products; the relative extent and frequency of 
price fluctuations in respect of these products; and the corresponding 
effects on the balance of payments, fiscal resources, international 
exchange rates or the level of economic activity. All these factors, 
affecting as they do conflicting interests of internal and external groups, 
make it difficult to secure unity and consistency in policy formulation 
and implementation. 
There is an obvious similarity between the institution whose 
establishment is suggested here and the Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO), which is analysed in the study on export 





Furthermore, the task of dealing with the many matters covered by 
foreign trade policy and the numerous component policies that go to make 
it up is generally spread out over agencies which are either autonomous 
or dependent upon different Ministries, This consequence of the functional 
organization of the public administration is conducive to immediatist and 
unco-ordinated action on the part of the agencies concerned. It may be 
the Central Bank that in its preocupation which short-term phenomena adopts 
measures which are not compatible with credit or exchange support for 
industrial development or the promotion of external sales of manufactures,1 
or for imports of the requisite inputs. Or else it is the Ministry of 
Finance that opposes the adoption or hinders the application of tax 
incentives for exports; or it is the political prejudices of diplomats 
that hamper the conclusion of trade treaties or agreements, etc. Moreover, 
the vertical character of the administrative organization tends to isolate 
units responsible for complementary functions, and to make them more 
vulnerable to group pressures. 
Similar difficulties often arise in relation to other sectors, 
a fact which partly accounts for the ill-success of planning in its 
endeavours to co-ordinate the formulation and implementation of sectoral 
policies in general. 
It has not been possible to offset these effects entirely by means 
of formal organization on the lines of the usual model, which comprises 
a planning council formed by the Cabinet Ministers (and sometimes the 
President of the Republic), a central technical secretariat for over-all 
planning and sectoral co-ordination, and peripheral offices of a functional 
and regional character. Nevertheless, some headway has been made. Where 
foreign trade is concerned, this seems to some extent attributable to the 
collegiate agencies - foreign trade councils or commissions - responsible 
for the formulation and control of trade-sector policy. They are generally 1 
linked to the central planning agency, and their structure brings together 
the high political authorities - the Ministers of Industry and Commerce, 
Foreign Affairs, Finance, Animal Husbandry and Agriculture, and Transport, 
the President of the Central Bank, etc. It is sometimes through these 
agencies that top-level co-ordination with the private sector is effected. 
/The resemblance 
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The resemblance between the basic features of such structures in 
many countries of the region would suggest that they constitute an appropriate 
organic solution. Furthermore, countries in other continent have adopted 
similar systems. A case in point is afforded by Japan's central planning 
agency and Export Conference, although the latter, as might be expected, 
has a much more complex structure than that of the homologous Latin American 
agencies.^2/ 
But these organic structures have not always operated satisfactorily 
in Latin America. This partly supports the-fact - long familiar students 
of administration - that the strongest co-ordinating capacity does not 
derive from formal organization, but from the sway of an idea, from the 
formation of a public consciousness, from the practical success of 
leaders' decisions. 
The inferences that might be drawn from these observations would be 
in no way original, but would ratify recommendations that are beign 
repeatedly urged by many experts and businessmen's forums, to the effect 
that more intensive training should be given to sectoral officials, in 
order to improve the making and implementation of decisions; and that 
steps should be taken to promote national export-consciousness. The main 
objectives pursued by this second recommendation would be to counter 
the disruptive action of pressure groups ana to rationalize the widespread 
support needed for the application of measures to strengthen the sector.^' 
37/ See chapter V the document referred to in footnote 2/. 
38/ The importance attached to these questions in Japan is worthy of note. 
See again the study referred to in footnote ¿/, chapter V, section 1. 
In connexion with the training of government and private-sector 
personnel, special efforts have been made by the international 
agencies - UNCTAD and GATT at the world level, and in Latin America, 
ECLA, the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning 
(ILPES), the Inter-American Centre for Export Promotion (CIPE), CECON, 
the Institute for Latin American Integration (IKTAL), the Inter-American 
School of Public Administration (EIAP) and the Central American 
Institute for Public Administration (ICAP). A greater direct effort 
on the part of the governments of the region would perhaps be desirable; 
it might even be channelled through the regular system of secondary 
and higher education. 
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4« Administrative structure for the implementation of 
industrial export policy 
The existence of a collegiate agency responsible for formulating 
trade policy and co-ordinating its implementation does not do away with, 
the need for an executive agency operating, under the direction of a single 
authority, and endowed with adequate powers of orientation, control and 
co-ordination in respect of the other agencies to which executive 
responsibilities in the sector have also been assigned, whether these 
agencies are. autonomous or dependent upon other Ministries. Without 
such powers, the decisions of the higher collegiate agency would probably 
be left to a large extent unimplemented. Mention has already been made of 
the causes which are apparently most responsible for this effect: 
an immediatist and particularistic outlook, and vulnerability to group 
pressures, usually resulting from the administrative dispersion of the 
agencies involved. 
From the standpoint of formal organization, it is an awkeward matter 
to arrange for a single executive authority effectively to exercise 
powers of orientation, co-ordination and control over agencies dependent 
upon other executive authorities, especially when the latter are of the 
same or even higher rank. By informal means, however, it seems possible 
to secure operational efficiency given a combination of favourable 
circumstances: national export-consciousness; general recognition of the 
professional competence and qualifications for leadership of the authority 
responsible for orientation, co-ordination and control; and adequate 
technical capacity on the part of its supporting agencies, so that they 
can help it to make sound decisions. 
In some countries of the region a situation of this kind is showing 
signs of consolidation, with favourable repercussions on their industrial 
exports.^/ 
39/ Some light is shed on these questions and on the region's corresponding 
attempts to devise administrative solutions by the document entitle 
Organización institucional para el fomento de las exportaciones 
existentes en los países de América Latina (Organization of institutions 
for the promotion of the Latin American countries' existing exports), 
which was prepared by LAFTA on the basis of data and comments supplied 
by ECLA's Public Administration Unit. 
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Where this propitions, combination of objective conditions does not 
yet exist, or where the number of export lines to be launched or expanded 
is only small, it would seem that the "executive group" may prove an 
efficacious and economically expedient operational solution. 
It should not be thought that the executive group signifies in essence 
a sort of escapism from bureaucratic difficulties, as has been contended.^/ 
Its main characteristics consist, first and foremost, in the fact that it 
is an instrument for co-ordinating, under a single authority, agencies that 
should join forces in pursuit of a specific objective, and that are 
scattered over several Ministries, autonomous institutions and, in some 
cases, the private sector. It also implies delegation, to a greater or 
lesser extent as appropriate, of authority, to adopt substantive decisions 
and determine the operational measures required to put them into effect and 
to keep check of their implementation. In short, the executive group 
must be understood to represent and instrument of project management, and 
a clearer idea of it would be formed if its functions were defined 
as including the formulation and. application of the PERT of the CPM concerned. 
A point worth noting is that the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
of Brazil (which was established relatively recently and has as yet no 
strong tradition in the field of foreign trade) has been organized 
essentially on the basis of executive groups and autonomous institutions.^^ 
It should also be mentioned that a similar solution - sectoral executive 
groups - has recently been proposed for the launching of industrial policy 
40/ See P.R. Mota, 0 grupo executivo (The executive group), a monograph 
published by the Inter-American School of Public Administration as 
N° 19 in the series Instrumentos Administrativos de Implementasao 
Economica (Administrative Instruments of Economic Implementation) 
(Fundado Getulio Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, 1968). 
41/ For the relevant organizational chart, see Revista de politica e 
administrasao fiscal (publication of the Ministry of Finance, 





in Bolivia, with a view to taking particular advantage of the new 
opportunities that will be afforded by a small number of major projects 
relating to industrial complementarity and technical assistance agencies, 
within the framework of the Cartagena Agreement.—^ 
5. Support for national exporter enterprises 
One of the features of Latin America's outward-directed growth model 
was the passive character of public institutions, whose essential object 
was to register and control f.o.b. sales and exchange operations, or to 
protect trademarks and patents, generally of foreign origin and corresponding 
to imported manufactures. As far as c.i.f. exports of industrial goods 
were concerned, to the administrative lacuna was superadded the.fact that 
the entrepreneurial sector lacked export experience or was not allowed to 
export in competition with parent firms abroad. 
The administrative reaction to this situation at the country level 
may be said to have begun after the establishment of LAFTA and of the 
Central American Common Market.^/ Intraregional exports of manufactures 
have expanded vigorously since then, but the growth rate of sales to 
third countries has been much slower. This suggests that the Latin American 
institutions = legal, financial, fiscal and administrative - which have 
encouraged integration and intraregional exports have been much less 
efficacious as regards the promotion of extraregional exports of 
industrial goods. 
It has already been suggested that one way of boosting exports of 
manufactures to third countries might be to provide that international 
enterprises established in Latin America should channel an increasing 
percentage of their total sales into such markets. Furthermore, regulations 
to this effect would probably result in an increase in Latin America's 
extraregional exports of products incorporating more advanced techniques 
42/ According to information supplied by F, Fajnzylber in a report for 
limited circulation on a mission in Bolivia (1971). 
43/ See the document referred to in footnote 33/. 
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and higher value added. It would probably be difficult (not to mention 
strategically undesirable) for Latin America to attempt to compete with 
South Korea, Hong-Kong or Formosa, for example, in exports of labour-intensive 
manufactures to the United States and other countries, however generous 
were the tax incentives to the production and marketing of such goods.^^ 
A point to note is the difference in the treatment that should be 
accorded to international and to national enterprises, in respect of 
export promotion. The former should be compelled to export, in order to 
cover, and if possible outweigh,, the financial remittances deriving from 
their investment and operations in the region. To do this, they would 
probably need less official support and encouragement, given their 
knowledge of external markets, and the greater ease with wich they can apply 
techniques developed by their parent firms and can obtain external financing; 
besides which they normally have their own marketing channels and their 
products are usually well-known in world markets. The national enterprise, 
on the other hand, enjoys none of these relative advantages as a rule, and 
by definition does not remit major proportions of its profits abroad. 
The institutional support for research on third countries' markets 
to which reference was made above would constitute one of the instruments 
that would benefit particularly, although not exclusively, national or 
regional enterprises wishing to export. But there would be others, among 
which the following would appear to be the most significant. 
(i) Investment financing institutions. The region's experience seems 
to confirm that since the import substitution process started, the official 
regulations and organizations designed to tap voluntary or compulsory 
44/ "Producers in Hong-Kong have to pay only one-sixteenth of the wages 
current in the United States. But this is not all. In addition, 
the ceiling for the tax; on enterprises' profits Is 15 per cent, as . 
against 52 per cent in the United States. The difference represents 
7.4 per cent of the value of sales, which exceeds the proportion of 
costs corresponding to wages. In other words, the American producer 
in Hong-Kong gets-his labour free". See H. Hedberg, 0 desafio japonfes. 
translated from the Swedish by J.B. da Silva (Lia Editor, RIo de 
Janeiro, 1970), pp. 223 to 228. 
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domestic savings for investment financing have constituted the most 
efficacious instrument for the promotion of industrial development. 
This is a specialized subject on which ECLA has carried out a number of 
studies.^^ On the present occasion all that need be stressed is the 
obvious desirability of ensuring that domestic savings are used solely 
for financing national or regional enterprises, whether public, private 
or mixed. It would seem that the Régimen común de tratamiento a los 
capitales extranjeros y sobre marcas, patentes, licencias y regalías 
(Common régime for treatment of foreign capital and in respect of trademarks, 
patents, licences and royalties), approved by the Commission of the 
Cartagena Agreement, lays down satisfactory regulations in this connexion,^' 
(ii) Marketing enterprises. The frequent financial and technical 
weakness of Latin American industrial enterprises in relation to the costs, 
risks and difficulties of other types involved in the conquest of foreign 
markets suggests that the institution of enterprises for marketing 
regional exports of manufactures might constitute a particularly useful 
instrument. This has been a matter of concern to CIPE — ^ as well as to 
national agencies responsible for export promotion. The. fact that 
a document dealing with the Japanese "trading companies" is being presented 
at the Meeting bears witness to the importance attached to this question. 
45/ See, for example, "Industrial development in Latin America" and 
"Economic planning in Brazil at the level of the states", in 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. XIV, N° 2 and Vol. XI, N° 2, 
respectively. In the first of these articles see in particular 
chapter I, section 3 (b), "Financing of industry"; and in the 
second, p. 73. 
46/ In article 17 of this Régimen the following provision is made: 
"As regards internal credit, foreign enterprises shall have access, 
in exceptional cases, to short-term credit only, under the terms of 
the pertinent regulation established by the Commission, at the 
proposal of the Council". 
47/ See Consorcios de exportación (Export consortia), a manual recently 
published by CIFE. 
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Attempts to develop export consortia or other similar institutions 
in Latin America do not seem to have borne much fruit. The inference is 
that it would be desirable for governments to play an energetic part in 
such undertakings, through capital contributions, technical support and 
financial assistance.—^ As marketing enterprises should extend their 
operations outside the region (with the general exception of those concerned 
with distribution and retail sales), it would be best for them to take the 
form of share companies, in which the official development banks or 
corporations would participate, although private capital would also be 
allowed to do so, perhaps on a minority basis. 
(iii) Technological support. Albeit the definition of the industrial 
technology best adapted to Latin American conditions is a controversial 
subject, there seems to be a consensus of opinion on some points.^^ 
For example, it is agreed that technological research should be developed 
in the region and that institutional measures should be adopted which 
would induce entrepreneurs to use such techniques as are economically 
advisable both for the enterprise and for the country concerned. In 
particular, it is thought that the national entrepreneur needs disinterested 
technical support which will help him to select the manufacturing equipment 
and processes, the plant size and lay-out, and the methods of direction 
and management and administrative systems that will guarantee competitive 
levels of productivity. This would be especially important in relation 
to foreign markets, where national entrepreneurs would not enjoy customs 
protection, exchange and tax concessions, etc. 
In view of these circumstances, it would seem that in Latin America 
the following are the main problems and the corresponding institutional 
measures in respect of the transfer and development of technologies. 
48/ See again footnote 18/. 





(a) Financial remittances for transfers of techniques and 
use of patents 
The payment of royalties for the use of patents often constitutes 
a significant cost component and may therefore prove an impediment to 
export activities. Moreover, some licensing contracts include a clause 
forbidding exports (generally to third countries).-^ Lastly, the total 
royalties paid by enterprises are usually an important factor in the balance 
of payments of those Latin American countries which have already achieved 
a measure of industrial development. That is, the question is significant 
both from the standpoint of the enterprise and from that of over-all 
development policy. 
In one of the most highly industrialized countries of the region, 
a specialist in the legal and administrative aspects of protection for 
industrial proprietorship reached the conclusion that a very large number 
of enterprises were stiU paying royalties for the use of patents which 
had become public property; and that the government department responsible 
for the concession and official control of patents continued to accede 
to a number of requests for protection which should have been rejected, 
because no patentable innovation was involved. Moreover, the department in 
question exercised no control over the legality of new or current contracts 
which compelled national firms to pay royalties for the use of patents. 
The foregoing situation was not apparently due to administrative 
corruption, although the possibility of its existing in one or two 
exceptional cases could not be ruled out. The trouble lay rather in 
obsolete operational norms and methods dating from the period of outward-
directed growth and therefore, inter alia, establishing no control over 
unwarranted payment of royalties for the use of patents which had already 
expired. 
50/ The above-mentioned régime for treatment of foreign capital, adopted 
by the Andean Group, incorporates a general prohibition of clauses 
of this kind (article 20). 
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The position is probably much the same in most of the countries of 
the region, which means that it is urgently necessary to improve their 
legislation and services for the protection of industrial proprietorship. 
This is a field in which data processing by electronic methods may make 
an exceptionally significant contribution to efficiency. Co-operation 
between the national agencies concerned might reduce costs and increase 
benefits, particularly with respect to the smaller countries. 
(b) Techniques imported without overt payment of royalties — ^ 
are frequently not the mast economic from the standpoint 
of the enterprise and of the country 
It is common knowledge that as a general rule Latin American 
enterprises lack the financial ancl technical capacity to undertake the 
studies and experiments required for developing or adopting technologies 
which from their point of view will prove more economic and which will 
better serve national interests. Moreover, experience suggests that the 
foreign enterprises established in the region will not do so either. 
Although these circumstances have led to unanimous agreement on 
the need to step up government participation in technological research in 
Latin America, it seems to be a fact that the official institutions 
established for this purpose have not thrived with the vigour called for by 
the magnitude and urgency of the problems with which they have to deal. 
The foremost and greatest weakness observable in this respect is of a 
financial character. The data adduced by Ignacy Sachs speak for 
themselves.-^/ He also seems to be right in stressing the Illegitimacy 
of the argument that poor countries should not devote any very substantial 
resources to technological research, and contending that they should do so 
precisely because they are poor.^^ 
51/ The régime referred to in the preceding footnote comprises a list of 
current procedures in respect of indirect payment for transfers of 
technology, whether patented or not. 
52/ "A UNESCO study on research and development in twenty-five developing 
countries gives Argentina as having the highest expenditure per head: 
2.8 dollars per year, as compared with an average of 0.45 dollars for 
the twenty-five countries covered and about 60 dollars for the five most 
developed Western industrial powers." (See Ignacy Sachs, op. cit., p. 22.) 
53/ Ibidem, p. 26. 
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The line of least resistance to the intensification of financial 
support for technological research in the region would probably lie in 
linking up this activity to expectations of corresponding increases in 
enterprises1 profits. 
The costs of a productivity centre in Uruguay (Centro de Productividad) 
are being partly financed by means of a reduction of the interest rate 
payable by enterprises on the loans they request for industrial investment.*^ 
The economic and social development fund which has been one of the most 
effective implementation instruments in French planning makes the granting 
of loans conditional upon a pledge on the enterprises' part to modernize 
their plant, production processes and systems of management.^/ These 
examples go to support the practical viability of Ignacy Sachs' suggestion 
to the effect that technological research could be partly financed through 
contributions payable by enterprises as a prerequisite for obtaining 
industrial investment loans from official development banks and corporations 
in the region. 
Another incitement to enterprises to support technological research 
might be a provision that for income-tax purposes they should be authorized 
to deduct from their taxable income the amounts paid for advisory services 
under that head, or the sums represented by subsidies accorded to 
technological institutes, or by the underwriting of portions of the capital 
of the institutes in question. 
Some firms of consultants have accepted, as remuneration for their 
technical assistance services, a proportion of the corresponding increase 
in their clients' profits, or of "beneficiary shares" or quotas of 
participation in their capital granted by the said clients, 
54/ This project has obtained United Nations support. 
55/ These assertions are not expressly confirmed by the Fund's regulations 
(see Pierre Bauchet, La planification française; quinze ans d'expérience 
(Planning in France; fifteen years' experience), Paris, 1962); but 
they are by the instructions for diagnoses of enterprises adopted for 
the purposes of granting loans against the Fund. 
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The experience of Latin America appears to prove that technological 
institutes organized as public-sector departments, i.e., subjected to the 
regulations governing agencies financed by the basic resources of the 
Treasury, have not been successful, even in the larger and more developed 
countries, from the industrial standpoint. This is especially true in 
times of inflation, when anti-inflationary measures often include a drastic 
reduction of the real remunerations of public officials. 
The organization of technological institutes in the form of public 
or mixed enterprises would probably facilitate their adopting any of the 
above-mentioned methods of tapping resources, in addition to the direct 
payments received for services rendered. Moreover, this organizational 
pattern would make it possible to establish systems of remuneration of 
technical and scientific personnel which would prevent the brain drain and 
attract an inflow of talent. Lastly, it would simplify the task, of 
solving the technical assistance problem in relation to the smaller countries, 
which could reserve a share proportional to their needs in the capital 
of powerful multinational technical institutions in the region. 
(iv) Closer linkage with the private sector. The fields of industrial 
export promotion mentioned above are not the only ones in which closer 
linkage with the private sector would be recommendable. It should be 
effected through delegation of functions and through co-operation, 
especially in the cases and for the reasons indicated below., 
(a) Technical norms and quality controls 
In the technological institute were organized on an entrepreneurial 
basis and with the participation of private capital, its relations with 
producer and exporter enterprises would probably improve spontaneously. 
This would facilitate more factual knowledge of the nature of external 
demand and of domestic industry's potentialities for supplying it. 
Consequently, technical norms would tend to be more realistic and control 
of their application more expeditious. Latin American entrepreneurs 
often voice criticisms of the administrative services responsible for 
these regulatory functions. In particular, they refer to the slowness 
with which control operations are carried out, which in some cases has made 
it impossible to meet delivery deadlines or caused the loss of perishable goods. 
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The regulations governing proceedings against the State and public 
officials generally aggravate the difficulty of pinpointing responsibilities 
and securing indemnification of losses. This would be yet another reason 
for organizing the agency in which such functions were invested on 
entrepreneurial lines. Furthermore, the fulfilment of the functions in 
question might prove an additional source of income for the financing of 
technological research. 
(b) Commercial information service 
If the control of legal or contractual standards for export product 
characteristics were semi-privatized, some laxity might ensue, with the 
consequent ill-effects on the prestige of domestic production in foreign 
markets. This undesirable result could be prevented or counteracted if 
the files of any legal proceedings between importers and exporters on the 
grounds of failure to conform to the established standards were to be 
examined concurrently or subsequently by a specialized public agency. The 
exercise of this agency's function of official inspection and control might 
lead to the application of administrative penalties for deliberate offenders, 
such as exclusion from government export incentives, payment of fines, etc. 
The bodies responsible for control of compliance with standards, and their 
agents, would likewise be liable to administrative sanctions. 
The information and mediation service should combine these supervisory 
functions with assistance to national exporters, when it is clear that they 
have acted in good faith and particularly when the legal proceedings area 
instituted abroad. Endeavours should also be made to bring about an amicable 
settlement between the parties to the suit. 
(c) Simplification of procedures 
It often happens that rationalization of the operational procedures and 
methods of the public administration can be achieved and maintained only by 
virtue of pressures exerted by interested outside groups. Recognition of 
this state of affairs, which is particularly common in developing countries, 
should lead to the institutionalization of the export sector's co-operation 
with government efforts to reduce the costs, stages and deadlines of 




probably necessitate the creation of mechanisms for communication with the 
private sector at different levels of the administration - technical 
advisory agencies specializing in organization and methods, normative bodies, 
and executive departments, including, in the case of the last-named, their 
geographically decentralized offices.-«^ 
36/ In connexion with the points discussed in this section, see 
Handbook of Export Promotion (publication of the Ministry of 
Commerce of India), chapter I. 

